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Differing Mentalities of Civil Law and Common Law? 
The Issue of Logic in Law 
 
 
1. Mentality and Legal Culture 
 
In recent-day comparative literature, the term of mentalités juridiques is being 
used as the key through which the underlying basic difference between Civil 
Law and Common Law can be best shown.1 This term is to englobe the entire 
view within which law is conceived at all, is named and also put in whatever 
intellectual context. So it affords one of those paths or aspects for an approach 
that may be instrumental for a comparative investigation of legal cultures in 
general and the dilemma of their future convergence or divergence in particular.2 
 
 
2. Naming of Basic Units in a Normative Stuff 
 
From the wide range of linguistic expressions and other objectifications used 
in the direction of behaviour,3 the dilemma of rule and/or norm is not a 
scholarly issue in any direct sense. Neither the dilemma nor its resolution can 
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 1 An expression by Pierre Legrand. 
 2 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a 
Genuine Discipline. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 2, 95–113 and Legal Traditions? In 
Search for Families and Cultures of Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 3–4, 177–197. 
 3 To quote just one author from the rich international literature covering the topic, 
Opałek, K.: Theorie der Direktiven und der Normen. Wien–New York, 1986, 88 lists norms, 
rules and principles, alongside with persuasion, wish, proposal, request, supplication, advice, 
warning, as well as recommendation and encouragement, as directions of behaviour. In such 
a broad sense, see, from the Hungarian literature, Szotáczky, M.: A normák eredete és 
funkciója (Genese und Funktion der Normen). In: Ádám, A. (ed.): Tanulmányok Szamel 
Lajos tiszteletére. Pécs, 1989. 227–238. 
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in fact be derived either from the historical etymology of the relevant words or 
from investigations into the history of basic legal ideas, inspiring or merely 
reflecting one or another language use. Clear-cut distinctions of meanings 
regarding these two terms are not even specified either by various historical 
periods or by the historical cultures of law and legal thought developed in a 
diversity so far. Although their regular usages may be different compared to 
each other, in most attempts at a theoretical definition they are still decisively 
referred to as synonyms,4 as concepts able to substitute each other nearly 
completely.5 Therefore the issue whether one or another usage is preferred by a 
given language and underlying culture depends for the most part on mere habits 
of parlance. However, such habits may then (through the latently creative and 
socially constructive force of the consolidated and consolidating usage of 
language) get organised into certain (historically self-solidifying) blocks. And 
from then on, these blocks may in their own manners generate additional 
meanings, with specifications according to contexts, which may on their part 
also eventually lead to kinds of separation providing some basis for added 
theoretisation. 
 
 
3. Terms of ‘Rule’ & ‘Norm’ 
 
The term ‘rule’ [‘règle’, ‘Regel’, ‘regola’, ‘regla’] originates from the Latin 
‘regula’, while ‘norm’ stems from the Latin ‘norma’ as used to denote a tool 
applied by masons and carpenters in ancient Rome to draw the “carpenter’s 
square”.6 Or, “A regula, or rule, is used to draw straight lines.”, and “A norma is 
used to make right angles.” That is, “The carpenter’s norms and rules (meaning 
  
 4 For instance, “The rule is a synonym for ‘norm’ or ‘directive’ taken as the 
declaration of a prescriptive function.”–writes W[róblewski], J.: Règle. In: Arnaud, A.-J. 
(dir.): Dictionnaire encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie juridique. Paris, 1988, 346. 
An even simpler solution is proposed by the basically American The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia. New York–London, 1999, with the entry ‘Rule’ referred to–but speaking 
about nothing but–‘Norms’ eventually. 
 5 This is illustrated by the way how in case even of an otherwise minutely precise 
author–e.g., Pavčnik, M.: Pravno pravilo. Zbornik znanstvenih razprav [Ljubljana] (1995), 
217–240 and in his Die Rechtsnorm. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 83 (1997) 4, 
463–482–, one term is simply replaced by the other when changing between Slovenian and 
German languages. For a Hungarian and German inter-change, see also Peschka in note 30. 
 6 Online Etymology Dictionary <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/norm>. 
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the tools) make right–norms make orthogonal and rules makes straight–that 
which they shape.”7 
 In its present sense, ‘norm’–mostly in derivatives such as ‘normal, ‘normality’, 
etc.–is a product of 19th-century development, differentiating and homogenising 
human conditions as well as social processes and attitudes of production, for 
adjusting them to previously set standards. To denote nothing but ‘standard’, 
the term ‘norm’ was first used in pedagogy, and then, in health care, and only later 
on, in the course of the same century, it got also extended to standardisation in 
production and technology, for that phases and successive steps of the same 
industrial processes can be isolated, defined, combined and re-organised as a 
series of distinct patterns.8 
 Let us mention as an illustrative example of incidentalities in the history of 
the usage of words that, in its original meaning, ‘rule’ once served–instead of 
the causal succession meant by the expression of “if […], then […]”, implying 
conditional repetition firstly describing, and then, partly prescribing those facts 
which may in their conceptual generality constitute a case, and partly also 
ascribing a sanction to them–to express some basic backgrounding wisdom 
or synthesising adage, summarising the versatility of Roman jurisprudents 
indefatigably searching for the principles of a justifiably right–and preferredly 
exclusively right–solution.9 
 According to its philosophical definition, the rule is a “formula indicating or 
prescribing what is to be done in a certain situation”, noting in this very context 
that its prescriptive use affords a criterion with selective force and that no such 
use shall be overshadowed by those recently spread constative uses which are–
mostly as connected with the senses of ‘regular/irregular’, or ‘regularity’, and 
so on–worded as if they were merely descriptive.10 
 On the other hand, norm is the “concrete type or abstract formula of what 
has to be done, at the same time including a value judgement in the form of 
some kind of ideal or rule, aim or model”, adding to the definition above that 
  
 7 Pattaro, E.: The Law and the Right A Reappraisal of the Reality that Ought to be. 
Dordrecht, 2007, 62. 
 8 See, e.g., Foucault, G.: Surveiller et punir. Paris, 1975, 186 and Canguilhem, G.: Le 
normal et le pathologique 4e éd. Paris, 1979. 175. 
 9 For more details, see Varga, Cs.: A jogi gondolkodás paradigmái. 2nd ed., Budapest, 
2004. 33–34, enlarging explanations he afforded in his Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal 
Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 
 10 Lalande, A.: Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie [1926], Paris, 1991, 
906–907. According to Ota Weinberger’s similar (and somewhat simplifying) formulation–
in his The Role of Rules. Ratio Juris 1 (1988) 3, 224–240, especially para. 1, 225.–, “Rules 
are advice to be used in determining action.” 
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norms are mostly formulated in order to express some logical thought or act of 
will, or free representation, or emotion or ideal of beauty.11 
 When, accordingly, norm is taken as “synonym of ‘rule’ ” (with the latter 
regarded as somewhat “more general”12 or “more wide and generic”13), it is 
remarkable that in everyday usage the rule is still primarily an explicit or posited 
formulation–as the in-itself neutral and historically accidental outcome–of 
some ‘rule-enactment’ or ‘regulation’, while the norm is either the logical (i.e., 
logified) form of the above or the logical (and normative) prerequisite of the 
act of regulation itself. 
 This explains why ‘rules’ may either be ones of experience14 or, specifiedly, 
ones of a game, e.g., of the law (expressed as Spielregeln & Rechtsregeln). All 
this is unproblematic so far as we are only interested in them as the manifesta-
tion of (or access to) something else, taken as more basic. As to its apparent 
pair, ‘norms’ enter the scene when the rule’s intended or probable notation 
becomes problematic and requires further investigation in a way that out of the 
rule as the presentation of something made accessible to us, we start searching 
for gaining an identifiable message by means of the former’s logical (etc.) 
analysis. 
 It is surely not for mere chance that we can hardly speak of, for instance, 
‘creation of norms’; and we only speak of ‘provision of norms’ when we intend 
to emphasise either the field as being “normed” (ordained under regulation) or 
the artificiality of the said regulation. Notwithstanding, present-day literature 
suggests the idea as if the norm separated out of the rule by its mere linguistic 
formulation as a logical proposition. Actually, however, it is not the rule but 
the norm alone that is considered and also treated in an onto-epistemological 
(and, alongside with it, also psychological and logical, etc.) perspective, in 
order to be able to interpret it both as an enunciation15 and as the contents of 
denotation (inherent, among others, also in a psychologically examinable act 
of will).16 
 That what has been explicated above seems to be substantiated by the fact 
that while in English language, for instance, historical dictionaries specify 
  
 11 T[roper], M. & L[ochak], D.: Norme. In: Dictionnaire encyclopédique…[note 4], 691. 
 12 E.g., Perrin, J.-F.: Règle. In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit 35: Vocabulaire 
fondamental du droit. Paris, 1990, 245–255. 
 13 Borsellino, P.: Norms. In: The Philosophy of Law An Encyclopedia [note 4], 596–
598, especially on 596. 
 14 Ibid. 
 15 See, above all, Alchourrón, C. E.–Bulygin, E.: Normative Systems. Wien–New York, 
1971. 
 16 See, primarily, Kelsen, H.: Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Wien, 1979. 
 DIFFERING MENTALITIES OF CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW? 405 
  
more than twenty entries of meaning and fields of application for the usage of 
the single word ‘rule’, each of these are still related exclusively to the avail-
ability or prevalence of a given measure of behaviour, either indicating or just 
carrying and/or enforcing it, without any of them claiming even incidentally 
that the rule itself will serve as the denotatum (with the objectivation itself 
or its communication embodying for us this very measure either through its 
textuality and grammatical make-up or owing to–as reconstruable from–the 
logical interrelationship among its elements).17 Moreover, the pervasive strength 
of the English language mentality is excellently shown by the fact that not 
even the amazingly late and rather slow spread of the word ‘norm’ provoked 
any change. Namely in English, quite until linguistic (later on: linguistico-
logical) analysis grew into the main trend of moral philosophising in the first 
decade of the 20th century, the word ‘norm’ had exclusively been used to refer 
to some standard, pattern or measure made available, and by far not in order to 
imply that the standard, pattern or measure itself could have been embodied 
(objectified18) by it in a way that one and exclusively one single right meaning 
could be extricable from such an embodiment.19 
 In language use, we do not to talk about ‘logic of rules’ instead of ‘logic of 
norms’. No way in everyday practice we do equate the two terms with each 
other. Only a ‘logic of norms’ can be thought of, as if accepting in advance 
  
 17 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary Complete Text Reproduced 
Micrographically, I–II. Oxford, 1971, 2599–2600. In incidences far away in the past, such 
examples may affirm this: “Þeos riwle” [Ancren Riwle a (1225) {2 (Camden Soc. 1853)}] 
or “Þe pope […] forsook Þe rule of Þe olde tyme” [John de Bartholomeus (de Glanvilla) 
Trevisa: Polychronicon Randulphi Higden (tr. 1387), VII, 431 {Rolls series 1865–1867}] 
(original edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 881, column 3 and 882, column 1, 
respectively). Against the historically established use, it is exclusively the modern (and, in 
a linguistic sense, rarer) professional usage that can attribute the word such a meaning: 
“Either according to the rules of the common law, or by the operation of the Statute of 
Uses.” Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (1842), 
XIX, 379/2, quoted by Oxford English Dictionary, 882, column 2. 
 18 Obviously, this is a case of secondary objectification, i.e., one objectified by (through/in) 
previous objectification (copying the pattern of “secondary nature”, built by humans for 
their servicing, upon the genuine nature as found and made use of on Earth). Cf., in a legal 
context, Varga, Cs.: ‘Thing’ and Reification in Law. In: Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in 
Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985, 21998. 
 19 It is to be noted that from 1676 on, the word appeared in the form of ‘norma/normae’, 
always italicised as a borrowance from the Latin, and started to spread as ‘norm’ only from 
1885, albeit between 1821 and 1877 mostly in pairs of synonyms such as, e.g., ‘norm or 
model’, ‘norm and measure’ or ‘norm or principle’. Ibid., 1942, respectively (as in the note 
supra) 207, column 3. 
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that nothing but linguistic propositions conceived of (or prepared as to serve) 
as logical units can be subjected to either logical operation or any genuine 
linguistico-logical analysis. 
 
 
4. Variety of Denotations 
 
All this may lead us to the conclusion that in actual occurrences and according 
to a nominal definition, ‘rule’ and ‘norm’ denote the same, the former 
considered from the point of view of making it accessible (communicable) as 
a message and the latter from the one of logic, that is, as seen from the 
perspective of internal coherence and consequentiality of relevant contents. Yet, 
regarding either their genus proximum or differentia specifica, we have to 
realise that both their conceptual volume and extension will be different. For 
no norm can be found in a rule (or rules) but the mental reconstruction of its 
(their) message may generate one. Otherwise speaking, a rule may refer to a 
norm by forecasting the good chance that a norm can be reconstru(ct)ed 
through (as mediated by) it. For in itself, the rule is but a specific linguistic 
expression, while in logic an abstract logical relation is stated by the norm. 
Following this train of thought, we can also conclude that they are common in 
that, at least, none of them can stand by itself. A rule may come into being if 
thematised (expressed, declared, posited, enacted or promulgated, and so on) as 
such. And a norm may come to being in a somewhat reversed manner, namely, 
if a logical form is given to one or some of (parts of) the above in result of 
mental operations in intellectual (re)construction. All this notwithstanding, 
they are not and cannot be related as form and contents to one another.20 More-
over, they are not co-extensive either. After all, rules differing by language, 
culture, structure and expression (etc.) may be logified as expressing the same 
norm and the same rule (in case of intentional or unintentional ambiguity, or 
with omission of punctuation or misprint, etc.) may serve for the reconstruction 
of differing norms. 
  
 20 For the Hegelian-cum-Marxian use of this terminology, cf. Varga, Cs.: Autonomy 
and Instrumentality of Law in a Superstructural Perspective. Acta Juridica Hungarica 40 
(1999) 3–4, 213–235 and Heuristic Value of the Axiomatic Model in Law. In: Raimund, 
J.–Lothar, Ph.–Schweighofer, E.–Varga, Cs. (ed.): Rechtstheorieband In memoriam Ilmar 
Tammelo (25. Todestag / 90. Geburtstag). Münster, etc., 2007 [in preparation]. 
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5. The Uniqueness of Civil Law 
 
In terms of what has been said above, it is the norm that has become the 
cornerstone of theoretical system-construction in our continentally rooted Civil 
Law, based upon the axiomatic inclination to logification. It is no mere chance 
that the construction of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as the form-giver of the 
continental legal arrangement21 is founded on the Grundnorm, as it builds the 
derivation of validity throughout the entire prevailing law and order either 
on direct logical or indirect linguistic (conceptual) inference [Ableitung]. 
Accordingly, the norm is conceived as a logical unit which has been generated 
through logical reconstruction and can be subject to further logical operation. 
Therefore it is by far no chance either that both the need for and the conceptual 
performance of a doctrinal study of the law–with the call for a meta-system 
strictly conceptualised and rigidly logified upon the law (taken as a body of 
texts thoroughly consistent as concluding from the law’s very components22)–
were formed within the sole domain of Civil Law.23 (It is to be noted too that a 
theory of norms serving as a Rechtsdogmatik can be erected with no concept of 
  
 21 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Hans Kelsen, a kontinentális jogi gondolkodás formaadója [Kelsen as 
form-giver of the continental legal thought]. In: Cs. Kiss, L. (ed.): Hans Kelsen jogtu-
dománya. Budapest, 791–804. 
 22 For the law’s systemic property, cf. Varga, Cs.: A kódex mint rendszer (A kódex 
rendszer-jellege és rendszerkénti felfogásának lehetetlensége) [The code as a system: the 
systemic character of the law and the unfeasibility of conceiving it as a system]. Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, XVI (1973) 2, 268–299, and for the chance, as well as science-philosophical 
and science-methodological aspects of the doctrinal study of law, cf. Varga, Cs.: Jogdogma-
tika, avagy Jurisprudentia és társai – tudományelméleti nézőpontból [Legal dogmatics, or 
jurisprudentia and so on in a science-theoretical perspective]. In: Jogdogmatika és jogel-
mélet. Konferencia (2006. november 10–11.) a Miskolci Egyetem és a Miskolci Akadémiai 
Bizottság rendezésében: Programfüzet, 3–7. 
 23 The predominance of the analytical method in applied legal philosophy and the 
thoroughly constitutionalised doctrine of the law in recent decades may suggest a trend 
greatly changed by today. Hence, the preference to analysis comes from an external interest, 
and the elitist (libertine) development of such constitutionalism as achieved by the US 
Supreme Court with academic assistance (i.e., by non-elected fora) has not yet exceeded 
the impact once exerted by the German doctrine on the English legal thought during the 
second half of the 19th century, which may have enriched Common Law in both theoretical 
interpretability and conceptualisation without, however, dissimilating it from its own 
traditions. 
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rule implied,24 whilst a theory of rules dedicated to the law’s phenomenal form 
can also be built upon the exclusive basis of norm-concepts.25) 
 On the other hand, the culture of Common Law–which, instead of striving 
either for an exhaustive conceptual representation and textual embodiment 
(objectification) of the law, or re-establishing it according to axiomatic ideals, 
or also instead of reducing certainty of and security in law to logical deducibility 
from previously set propositions, focuses rather on the law’s social and 
professional environment and the reliability of the former’s responsible and 
responsive practice, on the rectifying medium of everyday experience and of 
feedbacks drawn from dilemmas of decision on the level of common sense as 
organically rooted in tradition, as well as on the force of social continuity able 
to framework both preservation and renewal in the law so far and in as much 
as it may be needed–does speak in terms of rules as an exemplification of the 
law, that is, as an accidental manifestation and incidental actualisation in 
situations when one has to declare what the law is actually.26 
  
 24 Kelsen supplies an illustrative example by avoiding the use of ‘rule’ (except for the 
term ‘rule of law’ with ‘rule’ meaning just domination or control) in his final theory of 
norms [note 16]. 
 25 See below, note 30. 
 26 This is well illustrated by the flow of literature covering the variety of areas and 
aspects of an academic interest in law which, historically drawing from the classical heritage 
of Jewish and Roman Law to span up to the present-day Anglo–American approach, uses 
exclusively the term of ‘rule’ as a phenomenal designation. Cf., e.g., D. van der Merwe 
‘Regulae iuris and the Axiomatisation of the Law in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth 
Centuries’ Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987) 3, 286–302; Kalinowski, G.: 
L’interprétation du droit: ses règles juridiques et logiques. Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit 30: La jurisprudence, Paris, 1985, 171–180; Clanchy, M.: A Medieval Realist: 
Interpreting the Rules at Barnwell Priory, Cambridge. In: Attwooll, E. (ed.): Perspectives 
in Jurisprudence. Glasgow, 1977, 176–194; Campbell, I. D.: Are the Rules of Precedent 
Rules of Law? Victoria University College Law Review 4 (1956) 1, 7–27; Jackson, M.: 
Austin and Hart on Rules. Edinburgh Philosophy Journal (March 1985), 24–26; Rosenberg, 
I. M.–Rosenberg, Y. L.: Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to Read Cases: Of 
Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules. The American Journal of Comparative Law 42 
(1994), 581–598; Frierson, C. A.: ‘I Must Always Answer to the Law…’ Rules and 
Responses in the Reformed Volost Court. The Slavonic and East European Review 75 
(1997) 2, 308–334. 
 In contrast, even in hypothetical situations when some normative staff is expressed in a 
logifying context, one can mostly encounter a norm-concept to base explanations. Cf., e.g., 
Fikentscher, W.: Methoden des Rechts IV: Dogmatischer Teil, Tübingen, 1977, ch. 31, para. 
VIII: ‘Die Fallnorm’ and, in a particularly telling context, Hassemer, W.: Über nicht-
juristische Normen im Recht. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1984), 
84–105. 
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 Yet, in a reverse sense, if rule is unconceptualised (without ever con-
ceptually related, analysed and/or classified to the depth), that is, if neither 
logical conceptualisation nor any systemic idea stands in a determinative manner 
behind the practical act of giving it a linguistic form, that is, of denomination,27 
then it is to be doubted whether a Rechtsdogmatik can ever be erected upon 
such a scheme. For no doctrine on the internal connection and coherence and 
conclusion can be built without being based upon norms.28 
 If and in so far as the norm is logical a unit, the rule is nothing else than a 
kind of proposition. As to their respective environment, norms may stand both 
on their own and in a systemic context. On the other hand, rules do presuppose 
principles, standards and policies that can, without being rules themselves, 
demarcate the sphere of the said rules’ relevance and/or applicability.29 
 It is for the “scientific” methodology of the doctrinal study of the law [legal 
dogmatics] to answer how and to which depth the unlimited (and in principle 
also illimitable) demand of logical correlation, consequence and coherence may 
(if at all) be complemented to with axiologically founded teleological considera-
tions. Therefore, the introduction of either broader (socially sensitive) definitions 
(confronting, e.g., free-law movement to exegesis) or brand new aspects (by, 
e.g., teleological interpretation) in an established discourse within Civil Law 
may equally induce debates shattering the normativism’s basic claim. In 
contrast, the a-scientific approach to law as paradigmatic of the regime of 
Common Law may openly admit that law can only cover (reach and challenge) 
  
 27 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Codification à l’aune de troisième millénaire. In: Mélanges pour 
l’hommage de Monsieur le Professeur Paul Amselek (ed. Patrick Wachsmann et al.). 
Bruxelles, 2004. 745–766 and Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 2, 89–117. 
 28 A conclusion like this is facilitated by the unclarified English word usage and also 
by the fact that instead of any doctrinal study, it was the attempt at an axiomatical foundation 
of sciences–e.g., Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica (1903) [cf. Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the 
Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 120]–that became instrumental in developing 
the linguistic analysis of law in the Common Law world. This very fact has anticipated 
English legal analysis not to be based on the very law but on sample sentences either 
authorly hypostatised or–as the early criticism upon Herbert Lyonel Adolphus Hart’s The 
Concept of Law had shown–although presented in a sociologising manner, yet actually 
constructed with no factual coverage whatsoever. Cf. Varga, Cs.: The Hart-Phenomenon. 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2005) 1, 83–95. For an exemplary elaboration, 
see Samuel, G.: Epistemology and Method in Law. Aldershot, 2003. 
 29 Practically the entire oeuvre of Dworkin, R. M.–starting from his paper The Model 
of Rules. University of Chicago Law Review XXXV (1967)–serves just the explication 
of this. 
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the field of practical reason, within which–perhaps to our continental astonish-
ment–sober everyday considerations are used to be given preference. 
 
 
6. Ambivalence in Praxis 
 
In sum, the dilemma of “rule and/or norm” carries marks of ambivalence 
inherent in coupling linguistic conventionalisation with attempts at theoretical 
(logifying and analytical) system-building upon it. (As a merely practical 
outcome, it is to be noted that albeit the Hungarian professional language usually 
refers to–by naming–legal rules, yet once they are subject to conceptual operation 
in doctrine, they are also treated as legal norms.30) 
 On the final analysis, both can be used as conceptually justified in their own 
place and within their own context, respectively. For words in any language are 
used instrumentally and according to established habits, while concepts are 
formed as mental representations according to homogenising requirements set 
up by the given theoretical outlook and framework. 
 All in all, we have thereby justified the moment of identity, ambivalence 
and duality inherent in the terminological dilemma of “rule and/or norm”. 
Despite any remaining conceptual uncertainty, we may find it fortunate that 
scholarship developed in both German and Hungarian language cultures belongs 
to the orbit of Civil Law, which makes an explicit difference in theory between 
the mere act of signalling the fact that there is a normative message made 
available and the logically processed conceptual embodiment (objectification) 
of such a message. 
 
 
 
  
 30 E.g., Peschka, V.: A jogszabályok elmélete [The theory of legal rules]. Budapest, 
1979. theorises upon norms exclusively [testified by its German version strikingly entitled 
as Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen. Budapest, 1982], after an obviously similar solution was 
already resorted to by Asztalos, L.: Polgári jogi alaptan. A polgári jog elméletéhez [A 
fundamental doctrine of the theory of civil law]. Budapest, 1987. 
